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Honors Thesis Abstract
This paper is a study o f effective competition in the United States Economy, for 
Sector NAICS 51 -Information.
The purpose o f the study is to learn current competitive conditions o f the U.S. 
economy, since the last study on this subject is at least 20 years old. It is impossible to 
do the entire economy in one semester, so one sector was decided upon as a start. Sector 
51 was “new” and full o f  exciting technology that is changing our everyday lives, so it 
was a good fit for a starting point for a much larger study I will do later. This paper only 
makes claims for Sector 51, not for the economy as a whole.
The method o f  research was that o f William G. Shepherd’s study completed in 
1982. It includes a great amount o f research, analysis, and drafting. The major 
“findings” are the actual results o f placing industries into competitive categories. I have 
found that the distribution o f Sector 5 l ’s $623,213 billion o f national income comes from 
the following sources: 0% originates in pure monopolies, 16.6% originates in dominant 
firms, 44.5% originates in tight oligopolies, and the remaining 34% originates in 
effectively competitive industries.
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Motivation
In 1982, William G. Shepherd stated that the United States Economy appeared to 
be far more competitive than at any time during the modem industrial period. (13, p. 613) 
He asserted that the strongest single cause o f increased competition was the emergence o f  
antitrust policy, though he also gave mention o f import competition and deregulation.
The ensuing 20 years saw a greater reliance on international trade, the effects o f  
deregulation, which were really in infant stages in 1980, greater privatization, the 
collapse o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, and perhaps a de-emphasis o f  
antitrust enforcement. The Microsoft case promises to be a landmark decision. AT&T 
and IBM have been left alone in the last 15 years or so, and further, regulation o f telecom 
giant AT&T has been virtually eliminated by the Telecommunications Act o f 1996, 
which I will discuss later.
My reason for undertaking this project at first was extremely simple, I was 
curious. My reason for this undertaking was because there was no new information about
W
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competition. The last comprehensive study o f the extent o f competition dates to 1980, in 
Dr. Shepherd’s 1982 article Causes o f Increased Competition In the US Economy, 1939- 
1980 in The Review o f Economics and Statistics. My purpose is to extend the research to 
include the events o f the last 20 years. For this paper I chose NAICS Sector 51- 
Information. This sector is at the forefront o f the “new” economy. It contains those 
firms providing online services, designing the software for those services; many means 
for online retail sales; broadcasting, information gathering, and several other aspects o f  
the economy. This sector o f the economy is growing fast, it is new as defined by NAICS, 
is worth hundreds o f  billions o f dollars in its own sector alone, and it’s growing 
competitive conditions are in question. Total retail sales affected by e-commerce are 
expected to be about $647 billion by 2005 (2, p. 69). The Clinton Administration 
declared the “National Information Infrastructure” was essential to maintaining 
international competitiveness in the information age (11, p. 93). Economic evaluation o f  
this sector is very important because long term impacts o f technological change are 
always hard to forecast, especially so in the case o f e-commerce, where market share is 
currently very far from equilibrium (2, 3). Along with telephone communications, 
railroad shipping, electrification o f production processes, and other technologies, this will 
become another part o f the critical backbone on which business relies (3, pp. 3 ,12). This 
sector contains many o f  these important firms.
Another reason this sector is important is that a great amount o f value can be 
added by operations in this sector. Value can be created by decreasing costs or by 
improving the match between buyer preference and the goods they purchase. Indeed, 
technology will often embrace changes that span both cost and the demand side (3, p. 5).
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Lower search costs in digital markets will make it easier for buyers to find low cost 
sellers, thus promoting price competition among sellers. This may be significant in 
markets where products are differentiated, reducing monopoly power enjoyed by sellers 
and leading to lower seller profits while increasing efficiency and economic welfare.
Care must be taken because electronic selling raises either great potential for strong 
competitive equilibrium in online markets, or for incremental price discrimination (2, p. 
69-75). But even price discrimination can increase social welfare by increasing the 
number o f purchasing consumers and thus reducing deadweight loss (2, p. 79).
The expressions “ information age” and “ global information economy” are used 
with considerable frequency today. The general idea o f an “ information economy”  
includes both the notion o f industries primarily producing, processing, and distributing 
information, as well as the idea that every industry is using available information and 
information technology to reorganize and make themselves more productive (26). 
Therefore, as a first step to studying the current conditions o f the U.S. Economy, 
applying Dr. Shepherd’s methods to this new and exciting industry seems a good place to 
start.
The increased efficiency from Sector 51 is likely to provide enough social gains 
for both consumers and producers to benefit, but the question o f who benefits by how 
much remains to be worked out (2, p. 79). This project will show the current competitive 
conditions o f this very important sector.
This Sector has a large effect on the economy today. The internet and related 
technologies have caused the costs o f many kinds o f market interactions to plummet. 
Technology is important to an economy since the internet creates value by vastly
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lowering the cost o f transferring many types o f information, on a one-to-one, one-to- 
many, or many-to-many basis. In cases where the product itself is information, the 
potential for value creation is enormous (3, p. 3-4). Sector 51 seemingly transcends the 
entire economy. The internet simplifies custom manufacturing, such as my built-for-me 
Dell PC. D ell’s experience suggests that changing the way that goods are made can yield 
significant cost savings and improvements in the match between buyer preferences and 
the goods they purchase (2, p. 8 ,3 , p. 76).
The potential for creating value by improving access to goods arises from the 
tremendous cost o f maintaining inventories in a wide variety o f products across 
geographically dispersed outlets, coupled with high search and transportation costs for 
consumers, which results at present in a great deal o f compromising on product attributes. 
In contrast, on-line stores benefit from enormous economies o f centralized inventories. A  
company like The Gap, which has close to 2000 stores in the U.S. alone, can carry 
inventory to meet demand in every style, size, and color combination at much lower costs 
when it does so at a small number o f distribution centers than when it attempts to do so 
on a store by store basis (3, p. 7). This is a way o f segmenting a firm’s market that 
provides great benefits to both producers and consumers.
This sector even includes the providers o f telephone and telecommunication lines 
on which internet services run. As the cost o f bandwidth declines, the impersonal setup 
o f internet shopping will decrease, as we will be able to see more product dimensions and 
have more direct observation o f products. The firms that provide software to run 
computers that get us on the internet, are in this sector too. Microsoft is a good example.
Carrying out this type o f project is “simple in concept but difficult in practice” 
(13, p. 613). Shepherd (1982) provides a model o f my study in “Causes o f Increased 
Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939-1980” (13). The degree o f competitiveness o f  
the U.S. Economy must be understood and maintained to protect consumers’ freedoms. 
Dr. Shepherd evaluated the economy for 1939, 1958, and 1980.
The Meaning o f Competition
The idea that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently is a core idea for 
this paper. First, I will review three essential elements o f market structure that are 
necessary to explain as they have strong bearing on an industry’s placement into a 
competitive category. Following that, I will introduce Shepherd’s competitive categories.
The meaning o f an industry’s structure is embodied in the size distribution o f  
firms (15, p. 7). Oligopolistic markets are characterized by a significant concentration o f  
sellers (1, p. 26). In oligopolistic industries there is a temptation for sellers to act 
“collectively” in establishing prices and outputs, whereas in atomistic industries, any 
attempted collusion will fail and every seller will act independently in adjusting to a 
market price and output which is outside any seller’s control (1, pp. 26-27). There are 
four important terms used by economists to assess market structure: market share o f  
individual firms, concentration o f the leading firms, the numbers o f comparable rivals, 
and the conditions o f entry.
Market share is that proportion o f the market any company holds. It can range 
from nearly zero to 100%. Conventionally, a monopoly holds 90%+ by itself. Market
share is the most important single indicator o f the firm’s degree o f monopoly. Higher W
market shares almost always provide higher monopoly power, whereas low shares 
involve little or none. A related topic here is market power. As market share increases, 
the market power attained by that firm traditionally grows because that firm is then 
receiving a larger than normal share o f sales receipts. The extra money allotted to that 
firm allows for purchases o f extra resources. These resources would otherwise be 
allocated to other competing firms. This impedes competition by possibly not allowing 
other firms to act on otherwise attainable gains from trade.
For the purposes o f this paper, market power is thought o f  as the ability to raise 
prices above competitive levels. This concept is measured in “degrees” o f market power. 
According to Shepherd, “a” degree o f market power usually appears when one firm’s 
market share reaches about 15%. At 25 or 30 percent, there may be a substantial 
lessening o f  competition. At 40-50 percent, strong market power is usually a given. As 
market share increases to one or very few firms, other competitors may be left behind, 
and possibly forced to leave the market. In a case o f effective competition, the firm 
would be run out for losing, or not acting on, gains from trade. In the case o f monopoly, 
firms are artificially driven from the market (15, p. 71-72). Either losing or not acting on 
gains from trade is a leaning toward lessening o f competition as well as a decrease in 
consumer choices. Too much o f this behavior may cause inefficiencies, and a consumer 
may see firms driven from the market. If this continues, there may be movement toward 
tight oligopoly, dominant firm, or monopoly.
Concentration is the combined market share o f the leading firms, commonly 
based on the top four firms. Four firms are used typically because the minimum o f the
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“many firms” needed to stop collusion is five (15, p. 8). There is some debate among 
economists as to the number o f firms needed to stop collusion, but in Industrial 
Organization and Public Policy Douglas Greer shows that around five firms is a fair 
number. His study with Art Fraas shows that collusion is least common in markets with 
either very few or very large numbers o f firms. This number puts us in some 
“intermediate” range where conspiracies occur. Five is what starts Greer’s cut-off, as 
well as Shepherd’s, and I use the same cut o ff for this paper (10, p. 401-403).
The behavior o f the top four firms and their concentration is studied. These firms 
may be acting collusively as a shared monopoly, thereby indicating a competitive 
problem, or they may be in fierce competition with each other, where there may be no 
problem at all, or they may fall somewhere in the middle. Relatively high and stagnant 
concentration ratios over time, little or no firm movement in and out o f  the market, and 
little or stagnant technological advancements are good indications o f approaching 
ineffective competition. These types o f situations indicate a tight oligopoly. All or any 
o f these following three: relatively low ratios, frequent movement in and out o f the 
market, and great technological advances usually show signs o f a competitive industry; a 
few exceptions will be discussed further along. Concentration ratios show directly the 
“degree o f oligopoly” (15, p. 73). In this paper, with four firms, less than 40% 
concentration is most likely safe, as the firms do not hold enough market power to act 
collusively. 40%-50% may raise questions, as rising concentration is a typical warning 
sign o f ineffective competition. 50% to 59.9% is a cause to investigate a little further, 
due to a greater possibility o f collusion. Shepherd states that at a 4-firm concentration o f  
60% is usually a tight oligopoly (13, p. 616). As concentration reaches these higher
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numbers, the opportunities for collusive behavior increase, since a larger quantity o f 
receipts is going to a smaller number o f firms, there is a better opportunity to collude or 
lower prices below cost to drive at least fringe firms out o f business. With a firm 
exercising larger and larger economies o f scale, there continues to be a gradual lessening 
o f competition. Careful watch is necessary here because price cutting is usually a step 
toward efficiency.
Finally there is a study o f barriers to entry. For a competitive economy, resources 
move freely to emerging industries from failing industries. Any firm that wants to enter a 
market should be free to do so with no limits other than the markets’ conditions. If it is 
profitable to enter, a firm will do so, if  not, they will not. Further, they can also exit 
freely. Barriers to entry refer to impediments o f this system.
Shepherd distinguishes exogenous and endogenous conditions o f entry.
Exogenous barriers are set outside o f the market but still have a substantial effect on 
entry, such as advertising costs, size, and economies o f scale (15, p. 76). Shepherd notes 
there are at least 22 sources o f barriers and thus, it is virtually impossible to estimate the 
“height” o f  actual barriers.
Efficiency means identifying and acting on all possible gains from trade. Scarce 
resources are allocated to their most valuable uses, given preferences and abilities o f the 
people trading in the economy. True efficiency in production and consumption promotes 
lower prices, better quality o f production, and shows the extent o f equilibrium in the 
economy. To be competitive means you are discovering efficiency. An absence o f  
competition may suggest an absence o f efficiency.
An “Effectively Competitive” industry shows entry into this market is reasonably 
free, and the top four firms hold less than 40% o f the market. The 1980 study shows over 
76% o f the U.S. Economy was in this category. Effective competition is different than 
the textbook definition o f competitive. The real question is: what is “effective” 
competition? Dr. Shepherd sheds light on this important question. To be truly effective, 
there must be many competitors, the actual number o f which is relative to market 
conditions. Further, they must be o f comparable strength such that each firm exerts a 
mutual pressure, so each firm must apply their maximum effort to remain effective in the 
market. This then, prevents competitors from raising price above marginal cost by any 
significant amount, and no competitor is removed from the market, save for the superior 
efficiency o f  others. Competitors should be numerous and reasonably well matched such 
that the competitive process is robust and nobody captures lasting control. Usually, this 
allows efficient, innovative and fair results (15, p. 1). The concentration ratios o f sellers 
must be relatively low. Entry barriers are minimal if  present at all. There should be 
some evidence o f healthy turnover, as gains from trade are found, exploited, and lost. 
Some firms will profit while inefficient ones are driven out by market forces. Products 
are closely substitutable. In a textbook definition o f competition there would be no 
monopoly or oligopoly. Further it makes impossible product variety, loose oligopoly, 
and monopoly. This is why we differentiate “effective” competition.
Effective Competition is an “all others” group that contains pure competition, 
monopolistic competition, and loose oligopoly, and so no attempt to distinguish them is 
needed at this level (13, p. 616). This is acceptable because Effective Competition does 
not require pure competitive conditions. Shepherd says the middle range is where the
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questions arise, because here markets often have just two to ten comparable firms and 
less-than-ffee entry (15, p. 18).
Ineffective competition, on the other hand, manifests itself by a dominant firm, 
tight oligopoly or a monopoly. One, or a few firms are able to raise price above marginal 
cost in a substantial way, competitors are prevented from entering, and one or few  
competitors is/are able to engage in price wars, driving the other(s) out. The otherwise 
mutual pressure among competing firms disappears, such that one or few firms are able 
to exert strong market power over others. The monopolist is able so set the price above 
that which is otherwise competitive. This reduces gains from trade for the consumer (an 
artificially high price) and other producers (resources can be allocated inefficiently to the 
monopolist). A  state o f monopoly traditionally undermines efficiency, slowing 
innovation, reducing freedom o f choice and shifting wealth from ordinary citizens to 
richer ones (15, p. 2).
“Tight Oligopoly” is the 1st meaningful distinction from effective competition. 
The four firm concentrations matter here. If four firms hold over 60 percent o f the 
market share, that is a fairly good indication o f a tight oligopoly. Oligopolies enjoy some 
elasticity o f demand, and are often able to cooperate in setting prices (15, p. 16). These 
four firms may be operating as a collusive oligopoly and may need to be regulated. If 
illegal operations are discovered in court, some fines, jail time, or other penalties may 
result. On the other hand, these firms may be in fierce competition and simply have 
merged to stay afloat. In which case, they may be protected under the Clayton Act. 
Examples o f  industries with tight oligopoly could be the aircraft industry, aluminum 
industry, or carbonated beverage industry (i.e. Pepsi and Coca-Cola). The last two
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companies are quite large but have not been broken up, while aluminum manufacturer 
Alcoa suffered the introduction o f competition in the late 1940s. There is the possibility 
that upon further investigation o f an Industry originally placed in this classification, that 
industry can be moved to effectively competitive if  there appears to be fast innovation, 
particularly technological in the Information sector, and flexible pricing.
The next category is “Dominant Firm.” A single firm controls 40 to 99 percent o f  
the market. Microsoft is a strong example o f this. The same standards apply as in 
monopolies, but with a few important differences. The allocative efficiency o f  
competition is lost here as well, as the dominant firm may behave much like a 
monopolist, but usually there is some degree o f competition because there are other 
firms. Microsoft is able to segment markets, a traditional characteristic o f ineffective 
competition. Different prices are set to different people and places. Second, while there 
is competition, the competition is minimal, which allows the dominant firm to exercise 
great market power, and quite possibly grow toward monopoly. Monopoly and 
dominance may arise from positive causes, such as economies o f scale and superior 
performance. However, the problem arises when the sources o f dominance come from 
neutral or anti-competitive causes, which exploit or even create market imperfections (15, 
p. 8). As Shepherd challenges his audience in The Economics o f Industrial Organization, 
it becomes my duty to asses the sources o f monopoly which will inform my audience if  
the monopoly or dominant firm rose to prominence by competitive or anti-competitive 
methods.
At the extreme, “Pure Monopoly” is a traditionally well-known situation. Pure 
Monopoly means one firm owns 100% o f its respective market. A few familiar examples
could be a local gas and electric company, the local water works, and possibly local 
phone and cable TV providers. Sometimes, these monopolies are regulated; other times, 
they are illegal. Monopoly is the opposite o f competition; it is one firm without 
competition. In theory, monopolies traditionally represent misallocations o f resources. A 
pure monopoly has only one firm, usually with high entry barriers and inelastic demand. 
A monopolist shows a departure from competition. Without competition, economic 
theory suggests there are inefficiencies. A monopolist almost always has an advantage 
when buying resources. Its profits are usually well above the competitive level. Further, 
a monopolist’s cost advantages allow it to segment markets. It can sell products in one 
market at a lower price than competitors, while making up the difference in some other 
market. While this is not necessarily bad, if  this practice is used intentionally, to restrain 
entry or drive others out or both, it becomes illegal. There is usually well-blocked entry 
into the respective market, as well as evidence that the monopolist controls pricing.
These elements lead to a lessening o f competition.
When Shepherd writes about a monopoly’s effect on economic performance, he 
(and everyone else) says the misallocation is defined as a reduction in consumers’ surplus 
(15, p. 44). The largest problem for the economy is that a monopolist represents a 
reduction in the freedom o f choice. Since it is understood that competitive markets 
allocate resources efficiently, a monopolist takes away market efficiency, leaving other 
producers and consumers worse off. This may necessitate an intervention by the 




The 1997 Economic Census makes use o f a new classification system. The North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS, pronounced “nakes”) was developed 
in cooperation with Canada and Mexico, and classifies North America’s economic 
activities at 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-digit levels o f detail. The U.S. version o f NAICS further 
defines industries to a sixth digit. The 1997 Economic Census played a special role in 
implementing NAICS as it was the first publication to use the system. For the purposes 
o f this paper, NAICS data were used for all but industry group 5111, which was not fully 
implemented yet, so some Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) data from 1992 were 
used. The hierarchic structure o f the NAICS works as explained in the following table:
NAICS Level | | NAICS Code j Description
Sector | [51 Information
Subsector | 1513 Broadcasting and Telecommunications
Industry Group jj 5133 T elecommunications
Industry j]51332 Wireless telecommunications, except satellite
J  U.S. Industry | j 513321 Paging
The “Sector” is the most aggregate classification level, always expressed as two digits. 
Information is given number 51. The third digit represents a Subsector, such as the 
broadcasting and telecommunications subsector. The fourth digit defines the industry 
group, the example is 5133, Telecommunications.
These classifications are not to be confused with the old SIC 4-digit classification 
which represented the specific industry. The fifth digit defines the NAICS Industry. The 
sixth digit gives us the United States Industry. Sector 51 consists o f 34 U.S. Industries,
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20 o f  which are new, according to NAICS booklets. Straightforward comparability is 
lost in the new system, so extra care was taken in finding out which industries were 
entirely new and which were revised or reorganized.
The main subsectors are the publishing industries, including software publishing, 
the motion picture and sound recording industries, the broadcasting and 
telecommunications industries, and the information services and data processing services 
industries. The unique characteristics o f information and cultural products, and o f the 
processes involved in their production and distribution, distinguish the Information sector 
from the goods-producing and service-producing sectors. Unlike traditional goods, an 
“ information or cultural product,” such as a newspaper on-line, or a television program, 
does not necessarily have tangible qualities, nor is it necessarily associated with a 
particular form. (26)
The following table is the list o f all 6-digit industries classified by the NAICS 
system, all United States Industries defined by the United States Census Bureau, from the 
1997 Economic Census. The 1997 Census contains the most recent information about 
our economy as a whole. While this project is a thorough coverage o f the Information 
sector o f our economy, it only accounts for $623,214 billion o f the $17.81 trillion dollars 
o f the 97 U.S. Economy, or 3.5% (22), so it by no means represents the conditions o f the 
economy as a whole, and no such claims are made in this paper. As discussed at the 
beginning o f this paper, however, this sector operates on its own and also has large 
effects on hundreds o f other U.S. Industries. While only representing 3.5% o f national 
income, it processes trillions o f dollars o f the U.S. Economy. Therefore, it is a powerful 
sector worthy o f discussion on a more detailed level. It is, and will continue to be, a large
and growing sector o f the United States Economy. It has an effect on the whole o f the 
economy, even internationally, as it contains industries that provide various services to all 
facets o f the economy: the national government, producers, and consumers. Some o f the 
firms in this sector provide a large number o f export services and products to foreign 
governments and firms, thus having a further impact on the international economy. This 




NAICS Competitive Concentration Income in 51 % of
Code Description Category Ratio ($1000)*** total 51
511110* Newspaper publishers 2 25.0 41,601,011 6.7%
511120* Periodical publishers 3 20.0 29,884,807 4.8%
511130* Book publishers 4 23.0 22,648,251 3.6%
511140* Database & directory publishers 4 (X)** 12,258,101 2.0%
511191* Greeting card publishers 3 84.0 5,338,986 0.9%
511199* All other publishers 4 32.0 5,604,847 0.9%
511210 Software publishers 2 28.2 61,699,420 9.9%
512110 Motion picture & video production 4 33.5 20,152,091 3.2%
512120 Motion picture & video distribution 3 74.7 12,508,661 2.0%
512131 Motion picture theatres (except drive-ins) 4 31.1 7,486,977 1.2%
512132
512191
Drive-in motion picture theatres 
Teleproduction & other postproduction
4 32.4 110,342 0.0%
services 4 8.7 3,684,397 0.6%
512199 Other motion picture &video industries 3 69.7 843,184 0.1%
512210 Record production 4 20.4 182,369 0.0%
512220 Integrated record production/distribution 3 66.9 8,735,863 1.4%
512230 Music publishers 4 48.5 1,368,407 0.2%
512240 Sound recording studios 4 6.9 540,601 0.1%
512290 Other sound recording industries 4 48.8 312,641 0.1%
513111 Radio networks 3 53.2 851,348 0.1%
513112 Radio stations 4 23.2 9,796,786 1.6%
513120 Television broadcasting 4 48.6 29,777,076 4.8%
513210 Cable networks 3 61.1 10,389,609 1.7%
513220 Cable & other program distribution 4 48.8 34,999,969 5.6%
513310 Wired telecommunications carriers 3 47.0 208,790,552 33.5%
513321 Paging 4 50.3 16,970,204 2.7%
513322 Cellular & other wireless telecommunications 4 51.4 20,918,658 3.4%
513330 Telecommunications resellers 4 16.6 7,592,298 1.2%
513340 Satellite telecommunications 4 45.6 5,096,182 0.8%
513390 Other telecommunications 4 44.9 1,133,004 0.2%
514110 News syndicates 4 50.7 1,402,374 0.2%
514120 Libraries & archives 4 24.0 860,933 0.1%
514191 Online information services 4 39.0 8,042,568 1.3%
514199 All other information services 4 40.1 794,692 0.1%





'Income data was available for 1997, however ratio data was not so 1992 data were used Source: (21,22,26) 
** (X) is a combination of 2 SIC categories, but both ratios are below 40, and barriers are low 
*** See Appendix B







The data was broken down by cross referencing some concentration data with 
data on previous receipts and current sources o f receipts. Mostly the data was 
comparable with some old SIC code manuals and then with the Technical Appendix from 
Dr. Shepherd. The Appendix provided insight into concentration ratios, showed cases 
that needed more attention before judging them, and set fair and comparable standards for 
classifying industries.
The 1997 Economic Census, compared with the results o f Shepherd’s study 
using the 1977 Economic Census, yielded a wealth o f information as to current 
conditions. Various books and articles on industrial organization, barriers to entry, 
industrial concentration, and federal government regulations and acts were used in this 
project. Most information came from the 1997 Census; the rest was needed to provide 
interpretation o f Census data and then to provide more specific and supplemental 
information where needed. I will be using Dr. Shepherd’s methods for this paper. They 
will be applied to the most recent data available.
The task here is to develop a “sufficiently detailed method for estimating the 
degree o f competition” in Sector 51, then to apply it to “the most recent year for which 
adequate information is available” (13, p. 614-615). Generally speaking, the 6-digit U.S. 
Industries were pulled from government economic census data, and their 4-firm 
concentration ratios were studied. Any dubious cases were studied further. Dr. Shepherd 
had government concentration data for 1939,1958, and 1977, so my estimations will be 
for 1997, the closest available to the year 2000. Dr. Shepherd discusses methods o f
attaining accurate approximations in his article, (13, p. 615) then explains that truly 
adequate data are not available. Shepherd goes on to say that the closest approximation is 
a 4-firm concentration ratio, which is available for manufacturing industries (13, p. 615). 
For Sector 51, concentration ratios are readily available and were used also. The 
assessment is made more difficult because within each structure o f a market a variety o f  
different “behavioral competitiveness is possible.” Further, industries may have differing 
values within each case (13, p. 615). Rather than basing information on mean values and 
the like, Shepherd (and the previous authors) have focused on market shares, and I do the 
same in this paper.
Dr. Shepherd noted in 1980, and the same is true today, that two kinds o f  
judgment are required. First, even when data are full and reliable one must often use 
judgment in deciding which category the industry fits. Second, the evidence is rarely 
thorough and reliable. One must use imperfect, informal data sources for analysis (13, p. 
617). The results are tentative, and some are debatable, but any errors in classification 
are likely to be random rather than biased (13, p. 617). While NAICS has made 
information more specific and reliable, the same sort o f rough judgments about the array 
o f  markets were needed (14).
For many industries, I checked entry and exit o f firms by checking flow o f  
establishments from the census and movement into new areas by companies in various 
industry reports. The data was available, with some crosschecking, for establishments.
In 511191-Greeting card publishers, for example, the number o f establishments has 
remained virtually unchanged for the last 20 years, and with high 4-firm concentration 
(84.0%), also very steady for the last 20 years, it is best classified as a tight oligopoly.
Another example is software giant Microsoft’s investment in a totally different industry, 
Cable network MSNBC. This move represents one firm from one industry branching out 
and co-creating a firm in an entirely different industry. As firms move into new 
industries or remove themselves from industries, the number fluctuates. However, little 
or no movement, with rigid prices and little technological advancement, may be the signs 
o f  a competitive problem. With a sustained pattern o f collusion and rigid market values, 
an industry with concentration o f even 40% may be placed in category 3.
NAICS U.S. Industry 511210, Software publishing, is certainly o f special note. 
Industry titan Microsoft is the driving force behind this industry, and on November 5, 
1999, was convicted o f illegal monopolization (6). Microsoft continues normal 
operations, subject to a resolution, as that case is currently under appeal. Microsoft’s 
dominance lies in that any software must be built on a platform o f some kind. That 
platform is typically called an operating system (OS). A few familiar names are the open 
system called Linux and Microsoft’s Windows. With Microsoft’s Windows OS running 
90% o f the world’s personal computers, applications software o f any kind benefits by 
using a Microsoft base for its program to work properly. This has given Microsoft virtual 
monopoly power in OS and business applications software, the two biggest sellers in 
software.
Several other companies are writing various kinds o f software. However, all 
these companies’ software must run on an operating system, and 90% o f those operating 
systems are Microsoft’s Windows. Many consumers, no matter what they buy for their 
computers, must pay homage to Microsoft. Typically, an Intel processor-based PC is 
shipped with a Windows edition OS. As o f the 1997 Economic Census, the top four
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firms have a CR o f 28.8, seemingly in category 4. Upon closer study o f this industry, 
there are several forms o f software: operating systems, such as Linux and Windows, and 
business applications, such as Office. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software is 
used in automating “back office” business processes and helping manage a company’s 
day-to-day operations in manufacturing, distribution, accounting, and Human Resource 
divisions. The major players here are SAP AG, Oracle, PeopleSoft Inc., J.D. Edwards 
and Co., and Baan N.V. Consumer Relationship Management (CRM) software 
automates sales, marketing, call center, and field service operations. The largest player 
here is Siebel Systems, followed by Vantive Corporation, and Clarify Inc. In 2000 CRM 
software was a $23 billion market. Another type o f software is Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) software, which provides help to manage the flow o f products 
across the supply chain, from raw materials procurement through manufacturing and 
distribution to delivery o f final goods to consumers. In 1999, this market was worth $4.4 
billion, with leader i2, followed by Manugistics Group Inc. ERP leaders SAP AG and 
Oracle are expected to challenge significantly here. There are also Applications Service 
Providers (ASP) and Internet Security software.
The overall software leaders are Microsoft, IBM, and Sun Microsystems (4). The 
above-mentioned sellers have three options: (a) compete with Microsoft, (b) make their 
software compatible with Microsoft, or (c) cooperate with Microsoft. The difference in 
the last two is this: the companies may either design software on a Microsoft base or 
Microsoft is called in with the other firm to provide the necessary hardware and/or 
software to make the system or network run properly. So, the firm simply provides 
Microsoft compatible software or hardware, or they make a deal with Microsoft for
Microsoft to provide compatible equipment, be it software, network setups, or otherwise
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(4). A vertical problem arises here. All market power derives from final demand. Thus, 
the dominance “upstream” is enough to exercise market power over final consumers in 
this market. Microsoft, therefore, holds a strong dominant firm (category 2) position in a 
relatively low concentrated industry, regardless o f where competition comes from or how  
fierce they claim it may be.
U.S. Industry 512110-Motion Picture and Video Production, is a category four 
with a CR o f 33.5 that deserves some explaining. This category is divided into two 7- 
digit sub-U.S. industry categories. Motion Picture Production (except for TV) and 
Motion Picture & Video Production for TV are the sub-categories. It is arguable that 
tight oligopoly is in place here; with sub-category Motion Picture Production (except for 
TV) having a CR o f 53.6, but the potential for entry is very possible, with many 
worldwide studios available for production needs. Hollywood is increasingly shooting 
films overseas and across our borders, for various reasons, including lower costs, film 
production incentives, and non-union labor (5). TV stations also have potential entry 
and motion picture studios cooperate competitively with movie studios for production 
needs. Motion Pictures are in competition with Cable and Broadcast networks as well as 
internet and video games, and all are in competition with Motion Pictures. With TVs and 
cable as well as video game systems and internet service prices at affordable competitive 
levels, this industry is classified as effectively competitive. Further, the industry reports 
state that in film entertainment, conglomerates have advantages, but the real advantage is 
that they are able to diversify. This industry is one to watch, as these firms may start 
buying out several potential competitors. However, new entry DreamWorks SKG is
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growing strongly, but only after about $3 billion initial capital fund raising. In this 
industry however, revenues change greatly every few years. Disney appears to be the 
only case with consistently high revenue marks; however, theirs too changes yearly (5). 
The top revenue studio one year may not be in the top five or ten the next year (5). In 
1997 for example, Sony held 20.4% o f box office receipts, but fell to 8.8% by 2000. All 
the movement and activity in this industry looks to be effectively competitive. There 
appears to be a very loose and flexible oligopoly in movie production. Imports are 
minimal as American movies constitute the majority o f the box office receipts in Western 
Europe and Japan. Thus, we give 512110 an effectively competitive label.
U.S. Industry 512120-Motion Picture & Video Distribution, has a CR o f 74.7.
This industry is further divided into two 7-digit categories also, separating Motion Picture 
Film Exchanges, and Film or Tape Distribution for Television. Here there is a tight 
oligopoly, not a dominant firm due to a further separation at the U.S. Industry level. The 
further levels are held to tight oligopoly by licensing and contracts allowing for some 
exclusivity as these industries are primarily engaged in acquiring the rights to distribute 
motion pictures (25). However, there is no one firm that holds itself too high above its 
competitors. Tight oligopoly fits best here.
AT&T is known by almost everyone as a true giant in its industry, NAICS 
513310, Wired Telecommunications Carriers. This industry is distinct from telephone 
equipment manufacturing, which will be discussed in a later paper. Throughout the last 
100 years, AT&T held dominant firm position (category 2), or pure monopoly (category 
1). The sluggish performance in a monopolistic industry was shown when AT&T was 
slow to bring in dialing in the 1940s in place o f live operators, slow to adopt electronic
switching in the 1960s, and slow to install optical fibers in the 1970s and 1980s (16). 
Creative destruction may result in a monopoly market, as in the case o f AT&T’s slow  
innovation (13, p. 616). For example, AT&T’s inflexibility was shown in vigorous fights 
against simple little “mouthpiece hoods” and Bell System equipment could only be 
rented, not bought. There were no wall jacks permitting equipment to be plugged in. An 
extension cord for a residence telephone would have to be rented from the local Bell 
Company, at a rate o f  perhaps $3 per month, ($36 per year) for a wire costing perhaps $1 
to produce. (16, pp. 345, 360)
As o f the last study o f the U.S. Economy, William G. Shepherd listed this 
industry as category 2 with AT&T the dominant firm (17). Also in 1982, he noted that 
throughout the economy it was “important to maintain effective antitrust, regulatory and 
international trade policies in order to sustain” the then-new degree o f competition (13, p. 
613). Two years later in 1984, AT&T agreed to a break up o f what was then the world’s 
largest company. The following 18 years have seen an explosion o f new firms, and new  
technology.
A topic very relevant to this U.S. Industry is the passage o f the 
Telecommunications Act o f 1996. The Telecommunications Act o f 1996 (the “Act”) is 
the first major overhaul o f telecommunications law in almost 62 years. The goal o f this 
new law is to let anyone enter any communications business — to let any communications 
business compete in any market against any other (7). The 1996 Telecommunications 
Act permitted telephone companies and cable operators to enter one another’s lines o f  
business. Also FCC rule changes have relaxed rules that previously limited companies 
absolute size as well as relative size in a given market (5, 28). Since then merger activity
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and “cross industry” investment has been moving at a frenzied pace (4, 5). While 
concentration ratios have remained frequently above the 40 percent mark, competition 
has significantly increased, in some traditionally highly concentrated industries. Rural 
Markets, as defined in the Act, are the only real exemptions throughout the Act, but are 
still required to provide adequate information to the FCC to maintain their 
“independence” from the Act, relative to precise conditions laid out by the FCC. This 
Act first removes barriers to entry by prohibiting any state or local jurisdiction from 
blocking any entity from providing telecommunications services. Next it maintains that 
all telecommunications carriers are required to interconnect directly or indirectly with 
other carriers. This includes Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), as defined in the Act, and 
Incumbent LECs. The Act provides for Universal Service. Universal Service is an 
“evolving” level o f telecommunications services that the FCC determines are essential, 
have been subscribed to by a majority o f customers, are being deployed in public 
networks by carriers and are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity. The Act allows for Bell Operating Companies (BOC) entry into long distance 
and manufacturing. Telephone companies are allowed to offer video programming 
directly to their subscribers within their service area, under regulation. Buyouts are 
permitted as well, a telephone company may own more than 10% interest in a cable 
company, and vice versa, under certain regulations.
Throughout this Act there is regulation for almost every subsection, most 
frequently the regulations are price cap regulations. The great difference, economically, 
is that barriers to entry have been removed, deregulation has increased, and the FCC is 
required to review regulations every 2 years. This has caused greater crossownership,
merger, and buyout activity in the telecommunications industry group (NAICS 5133). 
This industry group affects directly almost 20% of this entire sector’s U.S. Industries 
(28).
The Telecommunications Act o f 1996 appears to be the driving force behind 
movement to effective competition in telecommunications. It has great intentions for the 
U.S. Economy, and federal regulators have been highly effective in implementing the 
Act, which has stimulated competition in communications markets across the United 
States. Respect must be paid to comments made by Dr. Shepherd in his 1993 article in 
Larry Duetsch’s Industry Studies. (See source 16) Dr. Shepherd makes it clear that long­
distance service, a major part o f U.S. Industry 513310, which is the single largest player 
financially, in Sector 51, does not have effective competition, nor is effective competition 
imminent. I concur, and that is why I have placed U.S. Industry 513310 in category 3. 
Further, Shepherd also states that any moves toward deregulating AT&T require caution, 
sophistication, and a clear use o f competitive criteria. (16, p. 360) Based on Shepherd’s 
idea that effective deregulation was not possible for 5 to seven years, the U.S. 
Government may have passed this Act prematurely. Shepherd also takes issue with 
contestability as a possibility for increased competition. (It should be noted that 
contestability theory further says that i f  a market is contestable, other entry barriers are 
essentially irrelevant (15, 16). Whether you agree or not with contestability theory, it 
appears that Congress expects contestability to perform well in the Telecommunications 
Act o f 1996. It is obvious that the Baby Bells are seen as a large and powerful source o f  
competition to Ma Bell in long distance service. Also the cable companies are seen as 
powerful sources o f competition. The removal o f entry barriers in the Act are a stark
contrast to Shepherd’s analysis in 1993. Deregulation is in place and vigorous 
competition is expected to follow (See sources 3 ,4 ,1 6 , and 28).
The United States government has taken a big step in this respect. What has been 
done has been done and we are forced to watch. Unfortunately, the dust is still up in the 
air. It appears as o f this paper, the Act has worked. Conditions may be on their way to 
effective competition. The question is still there, however, will they stay this way. All in 
all, Shepherd’s warnings are still to be heeded, and we may be witnessing a powerful test 
case for contestability theory, as the Act looks to make the market contestable by 
allowing the Baby Bells to compete head to head with Ma Bell. This is a change because 
previously, the Baby Bells have been held at bay against going into long distance. 
However, AT&T’s apparent furious competition may only be a rush backward to 
dominant firm or monopoly status. This sector has been allowed to sneak by Antitrust 
with minimal trouble (16). Now that we have this Act, we must watch the outcome 
carefully. Effective applications o f the Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as the 
Telecommunications Act o f 1996 are necessary to move this sector o f the economy to 
effectively competitive levels.
AT&T still controls large market share, enough to remain powerful, but not as it 
once did. The 1996 Telecommunications Act allowed for reduced regulation and more 
growth, and the industry has responded with a vengeance. For the first time AT&T is 
part o f a tight but loosening oligopoly, category 3, that seems to be well on its way into 
category 4. N ow  is not the time to give 513310 as effectively competitive, because entry 
and exit is still occurring. At first, prices fell, then became stable and are now rising 
again. AT&T remained sluggish in implementing similar programs as Sprint and MCI’s
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“friends and family” types (5). But this once monopoly firm has come under attack from 
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its former partners, the well know Baby Bells, who are now allowed to compete in long 
distance. The attack is made more severe by satellite telecommunications resellers, and 
wireless and cellular phones. Prices o f cellular plans are beginning to seriously challenge 
the service o f wired phone lines.
The 1996 Telecom Act has further opened this market to competition from several 
new industry groups. Microsoft is currently investing billions in cable, 
telecommunications equipment and forging alliances with wireless phone service 
providers (4, 5). Current competitive conditions include pricing pressures, emails, 
wireless messaging, instant messaging, and chat rooms that have begun to affect the total 
volume o f long distance calls. The current competitive edge enjoyed by the Baby Bells 
has been supported by their new entry into long distance. However, the edge seems to be 
eroding as new firms pop up and grow, and the 1996 Telecom Act opens them up to 
almost limitless competition. Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) Verizon 
Communications Inc., SBC Communications Inc., BellSouth Corp. and Qwest 
Communications Inc., have all applied for, or are already offering long distance service. 
Independent Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) are subject to far less stringent 
requirements and many have launched long distance service (5). The leading telecom  
companies are branching out into other markets, primarily wireless phone, 
broadband/cable, and DSL services (5). The companies in those respective industries are 
now launching telecom services as well, thanks to the 1996 Telecom Act. Prices seem to 
fluctuate well with potential and current demand. Technology is a very influential 
driving force here as well (5). The balance o f power seems to be shifting from
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w companies to consumers. There is ample evidence o f movement in the 5133- 
Telecommunications industry group toward effective competition. Mergers and alliances 
are becoming quite common, and care must be taken to effectively apply the Sherman 
and Clayton and 1996 Telecom Acts to sustain the path toward true competition.
Another point to be made here is local service remains somewhat regulated, 
helping to increase the CR but not adversely affecting the competitive conditions, and the 
FCC is taking careful steps to review regulation every two years (28). In various sources 
there is little evidence that long distance service has fallen into effective competition (4,
5 ,1 1 ,1 6 ). However, the same sources show that true dominance by AT&T is gone, and 
it is part o f  a tight oligopoly. If the current trends continue we should see this industry 
move into effective competition.
The next case that I will discuss here is 513321, the Paging Industry. I classify 
this Industry as effectively competitive, despite a CR o f 50.3, but it is a unique case.
There appears to be no entry or exit from this industry. Anyone in the surrounding 
sectors could enter but few to none have chosen to do so. Barriers are essentially low, yet 
there is little movement. Collusion in this industry is easily available, but none is evident 
(4,5). The firms involved here use very similar technology, and this same technology is 
readily available to many other telecommunications firms, (5) yet no one is moving into 
this sector. The industry reports provided the insight that this industry is concentrated 
because it is becoming obsolete (5). Relatively few firms are participating, but it does 
not appear that they face competition from other paging companies. They face stiff 
competition from the all-in-one wireless phones. Paging is being run out while instant 
messaging, text messaging, wireless internet access, voice mail, paging, and phone is all
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placed in one small machine as opposed to one small box that beeps or vibrates, andW
scrolls a small message. The bottom line is while competition is lacking in this category, 
it appears to be obsolete, and is being overrun by technological innovation, thus category 
4.
Finally, NAICS 51 categories defined as “other” bring up another concentration 
issue I must address. Sectors 512199—Other motion picture & video industries, CR 69.7, 
512290-Other sound recording industries, CR 48.8, 513390-Other telecommunications, 
CR 44.9, and 514199-All other information services, CR 40.1, all have CRs over 40. 
However, only 512199-Other motion picture and video industries, is not effectively 
competitive. O f these four, only 512199 has medium to high barriers to entry. 512290 is 
a creation o f two partial categories from the old SIC codes. It uses audio tape technology 
that is now very accessible. Seemingly any person with the time, and the money to buy a 
tape recorder, could enter this industry. 513390 is not as easily accessible, however it is 
part o f  the currently vigorous telecommunications industry group, and any one o f the 
companies in Industry Group 5133 easily has the potential to enter that market if  they 
perceive gains from trade. 514199 is a dumping category made exclusive from SIC code 
8999 (pt) All Other Information Services, NEC (Not Elsewhere Classified). Again, the 
services provided here have very low barriers to entry. It includes telephone based 
information recordings and information search services on a contract basis (26).
Summary and Closing
Representing national income in Sector 51, again, in terms o f only the $623,214 
billion originating in sector 51, 0% comes from pure monopolies. 16.6% o f this sector’s
W '
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income was in the dominant firm category. 16.6% o f this represents $103.45 billion 
originating in dominant firms. For category three, tight oligopoly, 44.5% or $277.33 
billion o f  Sector 51 income is represented here. Finally, 34% originates in effectively 
competitive industries. This represents a total o f $212 billion coming out o f effectively 
competitive industries. It is o f note that in category 3, $208.8 billion dollars appears to 
be on its way to effectively competitive from 513310, as the wired telephone giants are 
introduced to the Telecommunications Act o f 1996, and come under intense pressure 
from wireless carriers and the internet.
The extent o f competition is this sector seems to be largely due to antitrust, 
deregulation, and technological development. Imports in this sector are minimal. A few  
examples o f  firms with imports against this sector would be Sony, and the Voice Stream 
global cellular network, the only one o f its kind (4, 5). Microsoft is currently in antitrust 
litigation, after being convicted o f illegal monopolization. AT&T is feeling the effects o f  
deregulation, the 1996 Telecom Act, large technological advances in the last twenty years 
and the results o f  antitrust pressure in the mid-1980s.
Overall, technological change and the 1996 Telecommunication Act appear to be 
the driving forces behind movements toward effective competition in this Sector. Anti­
trust policy is evident but really insignificant in this Sector unless something substantial 
happens to Microsoft. Dominating everything is technology improvements. The U.S. 
has seen the internet and computers explode, some cellular phones have become entirely 




This is a more detailed breakdown o f NAICS’s publishing sectors, relative to the





511110 Newspaper publishers 2711 Newspapers
511120 Periodical publishers 2721 Periodicals
511130 Book publishers 2731 Book Publishing (pt)





Direct mail advertising services (pt)
511191 Greeting card publishers 2771 Greeting cards (pt)
511199 All other publishers 2741 Miscellaneous publishing (pt)
All sectors are direct descendants o f SIC industries, or reasonably comparable, except 
511140, which is a combination o f two SIC categories. This is an example o f the more 
detailed breakdown used by NAICS. Previously any SIC code with a “(pt)” following it 
was simply one code with various “parts” to it. Several o f these now warrant their own 
code, and NAICS has given one to them. They are comparable in that they are the same 
description, merely now given their own code. For these, comparable concentration data 
were available, and used. Sector 511140’s previous data are two separate categories, 
with two separate concentration ratios, from two different sectors, and not directly 
comparable. The sectors are independently effectively competitive, so while the chart 
has no concentration ratio for 511140, it is placed in category 4, effectively competitive. 
The 1997 Economic Census has income data available and this data was used, however 
concentration ratios are not computed for 1997, so the closest comparable ratios were in 
1992 SIC codes, and these were used per the methods above. For all other United States 
Industries in 51,1997 Census data contained both concentration ratios and income data, 
and these were used.
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Income is defined based on Census definition o f “Receipts” as follows:
Receipts from customers or clients for services rendered, from the use o f facilities, and 
from merchandise sold during 1997, whether or not payment was received in 1997. 
Receipts include royalties, license fees, and other payments from the marketing o f  
intangible products (e.g., licensing the use o f or granting reproduction rights for software, 
musical compositions, and other intellectual property). Receipts also include the rental 
and leasing o f vehicles, equipment, instruments, tools, etc.; total value o f  
service contracts; market value o f compensation received in lieu o f cash; amounts 
received for work subcontracted to others; dues and assessments for members and 
affiliates; this establishment’s share o f receipts from departments, concessions, and 
vending and amusement machines operated by others. Receipts from services provided to 
foreign customers from U.S. locations, including services performed for foreign parent 
firms, subsidiaries, and branches are included. Public broadcast stations and libraries 
include receipts from contributions, gifts, grants, and income from interest, rental o f real 
estate, and dividends.
Appendix B
U.S. Dept, o f Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1997 Economic Census, Subject 
Series Summary, Information, Appendix A
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